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Anomalous or exceptional experiences are uncommon experiences which are usually
interpreted as being paranormal by those who report them. These experiences have
long remained difficult to explain, but current progress in cognitive neuroscience and
psychoanalysis sheds light on the contexts in which they emerge, as well as on their
underlying processes. Following a brief description of the different types of anomalous
experiences, we underline how they can be better understood at the frontiers between
psychoanalysis and cognitive neurosciences. In this regard, three main lines of research
are discussed and illustrated, alongside clinical cases which come from a clinical service
specializing in anomalous experiences. First, we study the links between anomalous
experiences and hallucinatory processes, by showing that anomalous experiences
frequently occur as a specific reaction to negative life events, in which case they mainly
take the form of non-pathological hallucinations. Next, we propose to analyze these
experiences from the perspective of their traumatic aspects and the altered states
of consciousness they often imply. Finally, these experiences are considered to be
the consequence of a hypersensitivity that can be linked to an increase in psychic
permeability. In conclusion, these different processes lead us to consider anomalous
experiences as primary forms of symbolization and transformation of the subjective
experience, especially during, or after traumatic situations.
Keywords: anomalous experiences, paranormal, trauma, hallucinations, altered states of consciousness, psychic
permeability, symbolization
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES
The origin of the scientific and clinical understanding of anomalous experiences dates back to
the end of the nineteenth century, and is based particularly on work conducted by scholars and
members of the Society for Psychical Research, in Cambridge, the American Society for Psychical
Research, in Boston, and the Institut Métapsychique International in Paris (Méheust, 1999). At
this time, philosophers, doctors, and psychologists such as James (1902), Myers (1903), Richet
(1923), Bergson (1932), and Freud (Freud, 1933; Devereux, 1953;Massicotte, 2014) were attempting
to understand strange experiences that seemed to resist scientific explanation, but that were
potentially important for the understanding of the human mind.
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Members of the Society for Psychical Research (Gurney
et al., 1886) published the conclusions of one of their largest
studies in Phantasms of the Living. Seventeen thousand people
responded to the question “Have you ever had a realistic
impression of seeing, hearing or being touched by a living being
or an inanimate object that didn’t seem to have an external
cause when you were completely awake?.” One in every 10
people responded affirmatively to this question, and recent
studies suggest that this proportion remains approximately the
same in the present day (Johns et al., 2004). However, the
epistemological and sociological status of these experiences,
along with their complexity, and their unthinkable nature at
this time (Méheust, 1999), led them to become progressively
marginalized in mainstream psychology during the twentieth
century (Le Maléfan, 2000; Evrard, 2014).
As we will propose in this paper, current progress in cognitive
neurosciences and psychoanalysis allows us to better understand
these human experiences, which were difficult to integrate into
scientific models until recently. The last few years have seen
many books and articles published on the topic of what are
now called “anomalous experiences,” mainly from the point
of view of cognitive neurosciences (Brugger and Mohr, 2008;
Krippner and Friedman, 2010), psychoanalysis (Eschel, 2006;
Brottman, 2011; Si Ahmed, 2014), clinical psychology (Kramer
et al., 2012), and anomalistic psychology (Holt et al., 2012; French
and Stone, 2013; Cardeña et al., 2014). Several definitions of
anomalous, exceptional or “subjective paranormal experiences”
(Neppe, 1980) have been proposed. They are defined by Cardeña
et al. (2014) as “uncommon experiences (e.g., synesthesia), or
those that, although they may be experienced by a significant
number of persons, are believed to deviate from ordinary
experience or from the usually accepted explanations of reality
according to Western mainstream science” (p. 4). Metzinger
(2003) defines them as “deviations fromwhatmight be referred to
as ordinary experiences, i.e., experiences consistent with typical
‘reality models” that individuals develop to cope with their
socio-cultural environment” (p. 16). Between 30 and 50% of
the population report having had at least one such experience
(Ross and Joshi, 1992; Evrard, 2013a) that involves the subject
being confronted with an “anomaly” that usually elicits intense
positive or negative emotions. In terms of demographics, these
experiences are manifested amongst people of all ages, genders,
education levels, and cultures (Evrard, 2013a). Moreover, even
if there is a complicated relationship between anomalous
experiences and psychopathology, they can’t be reduced to purely
psychopathological phenomena (Evrard, 2013a).
In taking a phenomenological approach, anomalous
experiences can be classified into 10 categories (Rabeyron
et al., 2010). Firstly, some of these experiences belong to a
category involving an unusual “perceptive” interaction between
a person and his environment. Thus, during (1) psi perceptions,
the person believes he or she has been able to obtain information
from another person (telepathy), at a distance (clairvoyance)
or from the future (precognition) (2) In Vision and apparition
experiences the presence of something or someone is perceived
in a quasi-hallucinatory manner, and is often related to or
considered to be a real event. (3) Out of Body Experiences (OBE)
implicate a change in body awareness and lead to the feeling of
being situated outside of one’s body (McCreery and Claridge,
2002; Blanke and Dieguez, 2009). From a more “projective”
perspective, some people believe they have a “paranormal”
influence on their environment. This is the especially the case
in (4) subjective psychokinesis experiences, which involve the
perceived ability to interact mentally with objects, and (5)
magnetism or healing experiences, which suppose inexplicable
interactions between living systems (Schmidt et al., 2004).
A third category concerns “encounter experiences” in which
“another world” is usually reported. This includes (6) Near
Death Experiences (NDE) (van Lommel et al., 2001; Mobbs and
Watt, 2011), which occur especially after comas or clinical death,
and which some people (after seeing, for example, a tunnel or
deceased loved ones) interpret as being a journey in the after life
(Parnia et al., 2014). A belief in life after death is also frequent
in (7) mediumistic experiences, which correspond to the alleged
ability to communicate with the deceased. In experiences of (8)
reincarnation, the person, sometimes a child, believes that they
have past life memories (Stevenson, 1967; McNally, 2012). (9)
Mystical experiences are also in this encounter category, and
relate to an intense and global feeling of having “become one”
with God or the universe. Finally, maybe the most surprising
of these experiences are (10) abductions, in which people are
strongly convinced that they have been abducted by aliens
(Clancy et al., 2002).
It is common for a single person to report having had
a variety of anomalous experiences, especially after a first
“inaugural” experience (Rabeyron, 2012). Accordingly, it seems
appropriate to approach and conceptualize them as a whole,
both from a clinical and a theoretical perspective. In this regard,
anomalistic psychology tries to understand and explain these
experiences (Holt et al., 2012; French and Stone, 2013), whereas
the clinical psychology of anomalous experiences aims to develop
therapeutic models in order to help people cope with these
experiences when they are associated with mental suffering (Fach
et al., 2013; Landolt et al., 2014). Psychotherapy can indeed
be useful in order to re-establish the individual’s well-being,
especially in counseling services that are specifically dedicated
to anomalous experiences (Belz-Merk, 2000). From this point
of view, these experiences question how clinicians are supposed
to deal with patients reporting unusual experiences that do not
fit with the patient’s or the therapist’s model of reality, and that
frequently engender an “ontological choc” (Mack, 1995). This
question relates to a recent study in Holland conducted on 640
mental health professionals (Corbeau, 2004; Evrard, 2013a), in
which half of those who responded reported having listened to
narratives of anomalous experiences produced by their patients.
Four out of five clinicians explained that they were lacking in
the relevant information on this topic which would allow them
to care for their patients appropriately. This topic also has more
global ramifications concerning the way in which clinicians deal
with hallucinatory and seemingly psychotic experiences, leading
for example to the development of the hearing voice networks
that help people cope with auditory hallucinations (Romme and
Escher, 2000).
As we will propose in this paper, these experiences are
best understood at the frontiers between different fields of
knowledge, particularly the domains of neuroscience and
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psychoanalysis. Interestingly, Freud himself had a great interest
concerning what was called “occultism,” and he published
several papers dealing especially with the question of thought-
transference (Freud, 1921, 1922, 1925, 1933), suggesting that it
posed significant questions for psychoanalytic understandings of
mental processes. While psychoanalysis and clinical psychology
contribute to a detailed understanding of the patient’s subjective
experience, cognitive neurosciences provide the conceptual
framework necessary for testing and exploring hypotheses
generated in clinical settings. As in the more global project
of neuropsychoanalysis (Kandel, 1999; Bazan, 2011; Solms and
Turnbull, 2011), the double stance offered by psychoanalysis and
cognitive neurosciences allows us to better understand human
psychic functioning (Northoff, 2012; Ruby, 2013). Given the
complexity of anomalous experiences, their subtle and varying
relationship with mental disorders, and their consequences,
which can have both positive and negative effects on mental
health, their specificity is more easily understood at the
border between psychoanalysis and neurosciences. Moreover, the
combination of these two domains allows us to reach levels of
complexity at which these experiences became better understood,
and avoids the risk of reductionism, which might occur if we
considered only some aspects of these experiences.
If neurosciences and psychoanalysis can be used to better
understand anomalous experiences, these experiences can, on
the opposite, be relevant to better understand neurosciences
and psychoanalysis, given that it is often at the margins that
new discoveries on more usual experiences are made. This
parallels the way in which psychopathology sheds light on
normal functioning. For example, a great deal of interest has
recently been focused on Out of Body Experiences (OBE),
because they seem to foster our understanding of the relationship
between embodiment processes and the self (Blanke et al., 2002,
2004). Virtual reality set-ups have been developed in order
to artificially produce the same kind of kinesthetic illusion
(Ehrsson, 2007), and these experimental designs have also
improved our understanding of phantom limb pain (Ortiz-
Catalan et al., 2014). Neurosciences help us to determine the
neurological processes associated with these experiences, while
psychoanalysis improves our understanding of these experiences
from a subjective point of view. Indeed, the neurological basis
of the OBE can hardly explain the spontaneous emergence of
these experiences, their psychogenic origin or the way in which
they fit into psychic reality as a whole. Recent research has
also emerged that conceptualizes Near Death Experiences (van
Lommel et al., 2001; Parnia et al., 2014) as a new paradigm that
aims to study consciousness and memory processes during and
after transitory clinical death (Thonnard et al., 2013; Charland-
Verville et al., 2014). While neuroscience helps describe the
neurological structures and mental functioning associated with
NDE, psychoanalysis sheds light on the transformative processes
following NDE (Greyson, 1983, 2007)1.
1Another recent example concerns, on a more experimental level, studies based on
psi perceptions which have contributed to an ongoing debate about methodology
and replicability in psychology and medical research (Bem, 2011; Wagenmakers
et al., 2011; Rabeyron, 2014).
In this regard, our aim in this paper will be to expose several
axes of research at the intersection between psychoanalysis
and cognitive neurosciences, including hallucinatory processes,
altered states of consciousness, psychic permeability and
symbolization. We will also base our analysis on clinical cases2
coming from a counseling service specialized in anomalous
experiences3 (Rabeyron et al., 2010).
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES,
HALLUCINATIONS, AND HALLUCINATORY
PROCESSES
People contacting the counseling service usually see, hear or feel
things that do not seem, for them, to have an internal cause.
They will interpret these anomalies concerning their perception
of reality in many different ways, depending on the type of
experience and their associated beliefs. They usually have a
profound desire to share these experiences, even if they are afraid
of being labeled as crazy or insane. This means that a lot of them
avoid speaking about them to their general practitioner, hence
staying out of the “psychiatry loop.”
A first approach would involve considering these experiences
as hallucinatory processes in the general population. As
previously mentioned, members of the SPR had identified a high
prevalence of seemingly hallucinatory processes in the general
population, and these results have since been confirmed by
several studies showing that almost 10% of the population report
having had vivid hallucinatory experiences (Johns et al., 2004).
Some researchers have proposed that hallucinatory experiences
could be the expression of a larger psychotic phenotype that
does not automatically equate to a pathological expression
(Strauss, 1969; van Os et al., 2000). For example, van Os
et al. (2000) looked at the prevalence of experiences akin to
psychosis amongst 7075 subjects from the general population.
4.2% of them had psychiatrist-rated evidence of delusions or
hallucinations, and 17.5% reported experiences belonging to
the register of psychosis even though they did not suffer from
schizophrenia. Johns and van Os (2011) concluded that “there
are normal individuals who experience hallucinations under
no special circumstances, and surveys have shown that more
people experience hallucinations that come into contact with
medical or psychiatric services” (p. 1129). van Os et al. (2000)
also note that the psychotic phenotype could be fifty times
more prevalent than schizophrenia in the general population.
van Os et al. (2009) remark more precisely that psychotic
experiences could be experienced by almost 8% of the general
2Before being interviewed, the patients were asked for permission that the clinical
material collected during the interviews could be used for scientific publication.
All cases were anonymized and transformed in order to make the patients
unrecognizable.
3The Center for Information, Research and Counseling about Exceptional
Experiences (CIRCEE). Most of our patients are referred by clinical psychologists
and psychiatrists, but we are sometimes contacted through our website
(www.circee.org). On average, 300 people contact us per year. There are several
other counseling services that specialize in these experiences in Europe, for
example the Institute for Frontier Areas of Psychology and Mental Health (IGPP)
in Freiburg, Germany (Fach et al., 2013).
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population, in which 4% would develop psychotic symptoms
and 3% psychotic disorders. The limits of the psychotic
phenotype would thus not overlap with the limits of the clinical
diagnostic of psychosis and the categorical approach of this
disorder.
Those who report anomalous experiences could belong to
this category of people who have hallucinations without clear
expression of mental health suffering. It is then debatable to
consider these hallucinatory processes as an early warning sign
of psychotic disorders, given that the origin and implications of
these hallucinatory processes are not agreed upon because of the
complexity of the implicated factors. In this regard, results from
cognitive neurosciences in this domain could be useful to better
understand the nature of these experiences. Thus, the original
definition of hallucinations proposed by Esquirol (1832)—the
perception of an object in the absence of an object to perceive—
seems to be outdated, and models have since been developed
in order to understand hallucinations from neurobiological,
affective and cognitive perspectives. Several models in cognitive
neurosciences consider in particular hallucinations from the
point of view of “reality monitoring,” which is a process that lies
within the broader category of “source monitoring.” According
to Bentall (1990), hallucinations should be considered as the
consequence of a faulty categorization: the brain interprets an
internal perception, representation or memory as coming from
an external source instead of an internal one. Hallucinations
would thus be the result of an alteration of the “judgment
of reality” processes and this alteration could be influenced
by a failure in the balance between top-down and bottom-up
processes (Allen et al., 2008). Some authors have also proposed
that a hyperactivity of resting state would lead the subject
to an externalized perception of its internal experience (De
Masi et al., 2015), while a hyperactivity of perceptive areas
would be associated with a decrease in the superior function
used for the judgment of reality. Hallucinations could then
represent a kind of “psychic retreat” (Steiner, 1993; De Masi
et al., 2015) whose aim would be to provoke a withdrawal
from the world, allowing the subject to avoid anxiety (Delespaul
et al., 2002). The subject is then “cut” from his relational and
adaptive capabilities, given an antagonist relationship between
hallucinations and attention on the external world (DeMasi et al.,
2015).
The role of environmental and emotional contexts is also
crucial in the experience of hallucinations, and numerous
environmental factors—such as, for example, urbanity or familial
lability (van Os et al., 2003)—have been demonstrated to be
common to the expression of psychotic phenotype and psychotic
disorders. The emergence of some anomalous experiences
could also be influenced by these factors and some studies
from the field of anomalistic psychology have, for example,
been conducted in “haunted” places in order to determine
precisely which environmental features favor hallucinatory
processes (Tandy and Street, 2000). These researches have notably
demonstrated the impact of low frequency magnetic fields
(Persinger, 2001) or infrasound (French et al., 2008a) on the
emergence of hallucinatory processes in the general population
and a “haunted” experimental room has been created in order
to try to replicate these phenomena in controlled conditions
(French et al., 2008a).
From a more emotional and dynamic point of view, these
hallucinatory processes would be tied to a lack of integration
of the emotional experiences, which would lead in turn to
hallucinations. Reality monitoring could be influenced by
emotional dynamics and meta-cognitive beliefs. Thus, when
thoughts do not “fit” with our own system of beliefs and
representations—for example, aggressive thoughts against a
relative—we will tend to “externalize” these thoughts (Laroi
and Linden, 2005) in order to avoid cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957). According to this theory, negative emotions
are “projected” toward the exterior and are articulated, under
some conditions, with hallucinatory processes (Laroi et al., 2005).
Interestingly, this cognitive model of hallucinations seems to
be aligned in part with psychoanalytical models and especially
with the concept of “projective identification” which was defined
by Klein (1946) as a process that “derives from anal and
urethral impulses and implies expelling dangerous substances
(excrements) out of the self onto the mother” (p. 99). Klein
(1946) has underlined in particular the importance of this process
during the “schizo-paranoid position,” in which the child projects
the bad parts of the self and aggressive drive onto the mother in
an indistinct manner. Psychoanalysts have since insisted on the
fact that hallucinatory and perceptive fields are a consequence
of subtle inter-relationships between intrapsychic thinking and
their “projection” into the other. Psychotic patients would regress
to the schizo-paranoid position, which in turn leads to a cleavage
of reality, where the bad parts of the psyche are projected onto
the environment and come back in an external manner.
Bion (1962) has further investigated these theories by showing
how certain patients are terrorized by “bizarre objects” loaded
with persecutory hostility. He attempted more generally to refine
the concept of projective identification, arguing that it belongs
to a global non-pathological process called “normal projective
identification,” in which the psyche needs to project some part
of itself in order to be integrated. In Bion’s view, when some
of the first mental constructions—called “Beta elements”—are
not contained by the mother, they will produce the “bizarre
objects” previously mentioned. Current analytical research has
since developed this conceptual paradigm in order to understand
the subtle relationship between intrapsychic and intersubjective
processes (Roussillon et al., 2007). From this point of view,
cognitive neurosciences would describe the neurobiological
aspects of these processes, whereas psychoanalysts would
underline their emotional and intersubjective dimensions.
Clinical practice with people reporting anomalous experiences
frequently implicates this subtle play between intrapsychic
content, hallucinatory processes, and projection. This idea is
illustrated in the following clinical case:
Over the last month, Catherine has experienced strange and scary
phenomena, like nocturnal “apparitions” and inexplicable noises,
accompanied by a feeling of a presence in her house. Interestingly,
she is not the only one in her house who has witnessed these
phenomena, and other people around her, especially her husband,
as well as her housekeeper, also report them. During the first
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interview, Catherine seems in a lot of anguish and she fears that
she is “going crazy.” However, she does not have any antecedents
of psychological issues and lives a “normal” life with her husband
and her seven-year-old son. When Catherine is asked to describe
what she reports as nocturnal apparitions, she describes a “small
boy dressed in red whose face remains unseen.” She also explains
that the inexplicable noises come essentially from the first level
of her house. These noises can take the form of footsteps or
something banging inside the walls. Catherine thinks it may be
the spirit of a deceased person “stuck between twoworlds” and she
is scared that the haunting may be a premonition that something
bad will happen to her son.
During several interviews, she provides details about the
nature of the nocturnal apparitions. They are reoccurring and
disturbing to the point that Catherine takes anxiolytic medication
in order to sleep at night. It becomes progressively clear through
Catherine’s associations that she unconsciously fears that her
son could be kidnapped. Indeed, before the first apparition, she
explains having heard something like “the sound of a key” as if
her son was leaving the house. Furthermore, the young boy that
she sees wear red clothes and her son has recently lost some of
his red clothes. . .After several weeks, Catherine has a dream in
which she finally sees the face of the ghost boy, which is none other
than that of her son, but “covered in scars.” She then associates
this dream with her own terrible fear of darkness and death. She
explains that, when she was a child, her mother would leave her
in a closet in the dark for hours. She seems very moved when she
expresses these feelings, and begins to elaborate links between the
frightening apparitions and her own history as a child.
When Catherine tries to make sense of the noises, she explains
that they probably come from “spirits of the dead” and she
then evokes her deceased father, whose grave she “does not visit
often enough.” She also refers to her mother who suffers from
Alzheimer’s disease, and Catherine says it is as if her mother
was already dead to her. She seems to have a lot of pent up
anger toward her mother, but she is unable to express her feelings
because of her mother’s state of health. Is she experiencing an
unconscious guilt that could be an explanation of the beliefs of
the return of spirits in her house? This hypothesis is supported
by several associations that she makes between “the first level of
the house”—where the noises supposedly appear—and “heaven.”
Progressively, after several interviews over the span of 3 months,
Catherine was able to gain insight about her own psychological
dynamics and the nocturnal apparitions ceased. It seems that
our exchanges concerning her own anxiety and her difficult
grieving process helped Catherine draw parallels between her
experience and her own psychological functioning, which favored
the symbolization process and led to the disappearance of the
hallucinations.
The experience described by Catherine could be interpreted at
first sight as a brief psychotic episode associated with a paranoid
interpretation concerning spirits. However, several aspects of her
experience lead us to interpret what she reports as being more
complex than just a traditional brief psychotic episode. First of
all, Catherine does not seem to be delusional when she describes
what happens to her, and she is able to express doubts about the
reality of her strange experiences. Moreover, her interpretations
in term of “spirits” come from associations during the session
and can be considered as beliefs without being a firm delusional
system, in comparison to what can be usually found with a
delusional psychotic patient. Moreover, her experiences are a
mix of hallucinatory processes and feelings of a presence that
occurs most of the time during hypnagogic states and not during
waking time. Finally, Catherine is not the only one to report
the phenomena; these are also described by her husband, her
son and their housekeeper, which is typical of “poltergeist” cases.
This aspect raises the question of a possible illusion implicated
in part in the experience reported by Catherine, rather than
exclusively hallucinatory phenomena, in which there would be an
objective source of noise that would be misinterpreted4. It also
questions the influence of “affective contagion” (Wallon, 2000)
inside the family as well as the group dynamic implicated in these
kinds of experiences, which we won’t analyse here. Considering
our previous remarks about hallucinations, Catherine may be a
good example of someone who could belong to the psychotic
phenotype without the emergence of a clear psychotic disorder.
It seems as if she was in an intermediary space, a kind of “buffer,”
composed of elements of reality, illusion, projected elements in
the environment and hallucinatory processes5.
Interviews with many patients reporting anomalous
experiences, like Catherine, have led us to observe that these
experiences usually appear during, or after, a strong emotional
and negative experience (Haraldsson and Houtkooper, 1991;
van Quekelberghe et al., 1991), for example an accident, a
romantic break-up or the death of a loved one. We have
proposed to call this specific reaction a “paranormal” or
“anomalous” solution (Rabeyron et al., 2010), which most
often blends hallucinatory processes and paranormal beliefs.
There is frequently an inaugural paranormal experience, i.e.,
a first anomalous experience that leads to many others and
that echoes an earlier trauma during childhood (Rabeyron
et al., 2010). This link between negative life events, trauma,
and anomalous experiences has also been confirmed using a
quantitative approach showing that people report more traumas
during childhood and negative life events in the year preceding
the emergence of anomalous experiences (Rabeyron and Watt,
2010). This first and inaugural anomalous experience could be
considered to be a specific coping strategy, which takes the form
of an original reaction to negative life events. However, this
strategy is rarely obvious to the patients, and most of the time
they do not speak about the negative life events, or they do not
spontaneously see a connection between the anomalous event
and their personal life.
These observations concur with research on the influence of
trauma on the emergence of a psychotic phenotype. For example,
in a longitudinal study including 4000 adults from the general
population, Janssen et al. (2004) showed that the risk of psychotic
symptoms is 10 times greater after childhood abuse. van Os
et al. (2009) also notes that traumatic or stressful experiences
predict subclinical and transitory psychosis, which could overlap
in part with the processes of anomalous experiences. Sommer
et al. (2010) also found a high prevalence of trauma—especially
emotional and sexual abuse—during interviews with patients
4A classical and surprising example is the noise made by an owl in an attic, which
sounds like the noise made by human footsteps.
5Later developments in the paper will propose a more precise interpretation of the
nature of this kind of hallucinatory experiences.
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suffering from auditory hallucinations, with the main distinction
between the clinical and non-clinical populations being the
positive or negative nature of the hallucinations. Thus, the same
risk factors could provoke psychosis proneness and psychotic
disorders, which suggests a common etiology. If there is a
link between trauma and hallucinatory processes, it is also
important to better understand if some attenuated versions of
hallucinations are signs of a future psychosis, and why some
patients will develop a chronic psychosis whilst others will not
(De Leede-Smith and Barkus, 2013). In this regard, Hanssen
et al. (2005) found that only 8% of people with transitory
symptoms of psychosis maintain these symptoms long-term and
fall into clinical psychosis. From this point of view, anomalous
experiences probably share characteristics with the etiology
of hallucinatory processes previously mentioned, even if their
phenomenology cannot be reduced to them (Cardeña et al.,
2014).
Beyond the influence of trauma on their emergence,
another specificity of anomalous experiences is their frequent
relationship with cultural and anthropological elements. As
already mentioned, patients reporting anomalous experiences
usually avoid psychiatric structures, being afraid that clinicians
could “psychopathologize” their experiences and consider them
to be pathological hallucinations. Consequently, many people
look for cultural and anthropological material that helps them
to make sense of their experience outside of a medical frame
of explanation (Camus, 2002). The subject’s environment would
thus, play a key role in the arising of the paranormal solution.
For example, even in western societies, people who witness
apparitions have access to a large array of representations,
beliefs, and alternative therapies (exorcists, ghost hunters, etc.;
Favret-Saada, 1977) that help them to avoid taking into account
their own psychological functioning. From this point of view,
anomalous experiences seem to be a kind of “cultural buffer,” an
intermediary cultural space where these borderline experiences
find cultural material that helps people to make sense of these
strange experiences.
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES, ALTERED
STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
Another approach to anomalous experiences, which is both
complementary to and intertwined with hallucinatory processes,
concerns their ties with altered states of consciousness,
which include phenomena like sleep states and hypnotic
processes. Many of these experiences—especially apparitions,
psi perceptions, OBE and abductions—indeed occur when
the person is falling asleep or waking up as seen in the
case of Catherine. A first approach involves considering these
experiences as a consequence of hypnagogic hallucinations. This
type of hallucination may affect 37% of the population (Ohayon
et al., 1996) and is often associated with sleep paralysis, i.e., the
inability tomove, accompanied by the impression of compression
of one’s chest. Twenty-five to thirty percentage of the population
report having experienced sleep paralysis (Cheyne, 2003), and
three phenomenological classes of experiences related to sleep
states are usually described: vestibular motor hallucinations,
intruders and succubus (Cheyne et al., 1999). Vestibular motor
hallucinations are close to the phenomenology of OBE, while
Intruder experiences include feelings of a presence that is
frequently associated with visual, auditory and kinesthetic
hallucinations. Succubus experiences are characterized by a
difficulty in breathing, a suffocating feeling, an oppressive
sensation in the chest area, and a feeling of an imminent risk
of death. From a neurocognitive perspective, the occurrence of
such phenomena could be the consequence of a faulty transition
between rapid eye movement sleep and a waking state. EEG
studies suggest that during sleep paralysis people are thus
conscious even if they are in REM sleep (Cheyne et al., 1999). This
specific state of consciousness may also induce hypervigilance,
which in turn makes the subject more sensitive to environmental
stimuli.
Whilst some people consider these experiences to be
pleasant and are simply curious about their nature, others
are tempted to interpret them using a paranormal framework.
Some people believe that a diabolic or an invisible force
is attacking them during their sleep. In some cases, simply
informing and reassuring the subject about the physiological and
neurobiological sources of their experience is sufficient. However,
in other cases, these experiences are repetitive, distressing and
linked to a more global intrapsychic dynamic. Abductions are
an especially instructive example of anomalous experiences
associated with sleep disorder during which people believe they
have been abducted by aliens (Hough and Rogers, 2007). In
some cases, the “memory” of the abduction is recovered during
hypnosis sessions several years later, and patients often report
that they have been the victim of a surgical intervention or a
rape committed by aliens. They are usually very disturbed by this
realistic experience and find it difficult to talk about. In some
cases, the experience even leads to post-traumatic stress disorder
and different kinds of psychosomatic symptoms (McNally et al.,
2004; McNally and Clancy, 2005; French et al., 2008b).
Abduction experiences are particularly useful in allowing
us to deepen our previous thinking concerning the nature
of anomalous experiences, hallucinatory processes and their
relationship with altered states of consciousness. We have seen
so far how epidemiological and psychiatric studies shed light
on the high frequency of hallucinatory experiences in the
general population, as well as on the impact of trauma and
environmental factors on the emergence of seemingly psychotic
experiences. However, although these experiences look the same
on the surface, they could correspond to different kinds of
underlying processes. We have discussed very briefly Kleinian
and Bionian’s theories in which hallucinations are interpreted
as being the consequence of projective phenomena in the
environment. The structural model developed by Lacan (1932)
proposes another perspective that improves our understanding
of the nature of these experiences. From a Lacanian point of
view, if abductions appear as a psychotic disorder (involving
hallucinations of aliens and a belief in their existence)—and they
will be sometimes considered in this way by clinicians—this
would actually correspond to a neurotic structure. This is argued
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by Maleval and Charraud (2003) following the theories of Lacan;
according to these authors, abductions would correspond to the
acting out of a neurotic fantasy associated with elements from
the cultural environment. More precisely, the abductee would
be playing out a scene of seduction where the abducted body
becomes another’s object of desire.
In order to understand this distinction, it is necessary to say a
few words on the Lacanian model of psychosis (Lacan, 1981). We
can only partially describe the model here, given its complexity,
but a brief description is useful in a more global manner to
help us understand the processes of anomalous experiences
and their relationship with altered states of consciousness.
Thus, a distinction is usually made between the “return of
the repressed,” as described in Freud’s definition of neurosis
(Freud and Breuer, 1895), and Lacan’s definition of “psychotic
foreclosure” (forclusion)(Lacan, 1981)6. In neurosis, repression
processes concern the way in which repressed elements try to
return or resurface in consciousness in a disguised manner (for
example, in the forms of dreams or lapses). An illustration of
this kind of neurotic process is given by Freud (1923) in A
Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis. Freud analyzed the
evil visions of the Bavarian painter Christophe Haitzmann in
reaction to a mourning situation (the death of his father) and
the need to find a more comfortable situation from a material
point of view (this occurred when he finally took holy orders).
Freud interpreted Haitzmann’s hallucinations as being neurotic,
and proposed that they could be understood with the same logic
as used to interpret dreams (Freud, 1900).
In contrast, in the psychotic structure analyzed by Lacan
(1981), in continuation to Freud’s intuitions about psychosis
(1911), the symbolization process is attacked in itself (Freud,
1911). The “Name-of-the-father” (Nom-du-Père) (a fundamental
signifier of symbolic castration) is never registered in the
subject’s symbolic universe (the forecloser of the “Name-of-
the-father”) and produces a hole in the symbolization process.
Thus, the subject is facing a collapse of the signifying chain
and is “unable to signify aspects of his existence along the axes
of metonymy and metaphor” (Redmond, 2013, p. 2). Psychic
elements are thus foreclosed from the symbolic order and these
elements return in the “real” (réel) hallucinatory reality of the
subject. The psychotic person is then facing an “overflow of
real” and elementary phenomena (e.g., strange intuitions, short
and enigmatic hallucinations, intrusion of the signifier) as a
consequence of the foreclosure (forclusion) of the Name-of-the-
Father. He is facing the terrifying abyss of the foreclosure and
has to manage to “bear” the contact with the real. The psychotic
delusion will aim to “fill in” the hole in the symbolic order.
Consequently, the psychotic structure, but also the psychotic
transference, will be specific, as well as the psychotherapeutic
approach of the patient. From this point of view, Lacan proposes
that he be the “scribe” or the “secretary of the insane” (le secrétaire
de l’aliéné) in order to help him to limit his jouissance. It is
necessary to be in the position of a “witness” in order to help the
patient to make sense of his history without interpreting what he
says. In this way, the aim of the clinician is to “put the excess of
6The Lacanian forclusion is close to the verwerfung in Freud’s writings.
real in the network of signifiers” (Brémaud, 2005, p. 697) in order
to support and accompany the patient in the construction of what
Lacan calls “suppletions” (suppléances).
Thus, even if the ability of the psyche to hallucinate
does exist both in neurosis and psychosis, the contents and
the form of what is perceived, as well as the underlying
processes, are different. Psychosis and neurosis can both produce
hallucinatory phenomena but the “neurotic hallucinations will
be the consequence of the return of the repressed and are open
to interpretation, but not the psychotic hallucinations produce
by the mental automatism” (Maleval, 2014, p. 9). With a patient
reporting anomalous experiences, the clinician will try in the
same manner to understand, in this regard, the structure of the
patient by “exploring the type of voice, the type of message, the
interpretation of these messages, the previous experiences, the
coping strategies, the emerging context, and the potential links
with the history of the subject” (Maleval, 2014, p. 9).
Interestingly, these diagnostic debates relating to
hallucinatory and anomalous experiences were described at
the end of the nineteenth century by Pierre Janet, in his use of
the term “extraordinary neurosis” (névrose extraordinaire) to
describe the mental functioning of mediums (Evrard, 2013b).
For Janet, this kind of neurosis involves patients with neurotic
or hysterical structures showing clinical manifestations usually
linked to psychosis, such as hallucinations and delusions.
Maleval also pursued a distinction between the “psychotic
delusion” (délire psychotique) and the “neurotic delirium”
(délirirum névrotique) (Maleval, 1981). The psychotic delusion
deals with the forclusion of the Name-of-the-Father, while the
neurotic delirium concerns “the fantasmatic projections focused
on the return of the repressed imaginary.” Confirming Janet’s
intuitions, and continuing the structural analyses of Lacan
(1981), Spriet (2006) compared mediums’ hallucinations with
psychotic hallucinations, and found that they were different in
several ways. Spriet came to the conclusion that a medium’s
experience is not psychotic but is rather the resurfacing of
repressed content belonging to neurotic processes. For example,
a psychotic patient might have a spontaneous impression that
they received a call “from God,” while a medium will make a call
“to God.”
In the field of anomalous experiences, Evrard (2014,
pp. 286–287) has proposed to use this kind of criteria in
order to make a clear distinction between an “anomalous
experience of the neurotic” and an “anomalous experience
of the psychotic,” depending on the type of: neologism,
belief, dissociation, automatism, potential voices, address of
the experience, hypnotizability, influence of the environment,
anxiety, projection, and evolution of the potential delusion.
Thus, some hallucinatory processes might appear both during
“extraordinary neurosis” (a clinical expression of neurosis
with hallucinations) and “extraordinary psychosis” (which
corresponds to a clinical expression of psychosis; Evrard, 2013b,
2014). A clinical case of abduction will illustrate these theoretical
propositions:
Beatrice is a 30-year-old woman who describes several different
anomalous experiences. They started when she was a child by the
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vision of a “blue light” and a “black silhouette” bending on her
bed. Her childhood is described more generally as an unpleasant
one, with an alcoholic and violent father and a depressive mother
who finally divorced. When she was a teenager, she was sexually
abused several times by a close relative leading to an abortion
she was not allowed to speak about in her family. Beatrice will
develop, in adulthood, psi experiences (especially precognitive
dreams), out of body experiences and apparitions, notably of a
“white and vaporous shape” leading her to a profound feeling of
relief after seeing it. But the main sources of suffering for Beatrice
are several “visits” of what she supposed could be aliens, even
if she is not really sure about it. During the first of these visits,
a few years ago, she was on her bed and suddenly felt that she
was paralyzed. She saw a “blue light” (the same one that she
saw during childhood) and felt there was “something” close to
her. When she turned toward it, she saw an “alien” taking her
hand with “scratchy skin” and “black and empty black eyes.”
She felt powerless and “entirely drained” before feeling a very
intense pain in her shoulder. Then, the being disappeared, she
cried and woke up her husband. Another visit happened a few
months ago. She woke up in the night seeing this time a “naked
body” whose gender or face she could not see. She felt that this
“thing” went behind her and that she was suddenly paralyzed on
her bed. She was “forced” to turn toward a “white being, with
“almond eyes” that finally disappeared, leaving Beatrice in a very
shocked state.
In the same manner as in the demonological neurosis analyzed
by Freud in 1923, the phenomena experienced by Beatrice are
labile and evolutive. They happen in a hypnoid state, concern
essentially sexual and corporal aspects, and are not associated
with a firm and definitive belief. Moreover, these elements
appear in adulthood after childhood traumatic experiences. Like
Beatrice, many people who report abduction experiences have
indeed suffered from sexual abuse, and they frequently report
sleep paralysis and hypnagogic hallucinations (McNally and
Clancy, 2005). Thus, the abductions cases appear as a type of
“crepuscural hysteria” (hystérie crépusculaire) as proposed by
Maleval (1981)—an extreme form of neurosis that corresponds to
the extraordinary neurosis of Janet—in which traumatic elements
return in the psyche in a disguised manner. These elements are
cleaved and “frozen” in the psyche, and the reappearance of
this content is signaled by the return, in a hallucinatory form,
of the traumatic experience7. Memories could be involuntarily
retrieved by stimuli associated with the trauma, and some
hallucinationsmay be the expression of such traumatic memories
(Hardy et al., 2005). In abduction cases, this holds especially true
for kinesthetic hallucinations, which may be a return of cleaved
memories of sexual assault. There would be in both psychosis and
neurosis a “hole” in the psychic reality, but its consequences on
the psychic functioning and their hallucinatory expression will
depend on the structure of the subject (Le Maléfan, 2001, 2014).
In particular, as described by Maleval (1981): “the hysteric do
not manage to accept her sexual body, while the psychotic has
difficulties with the language (. . . ) The psychotic is looking for an
7In this sense, abductions would correspond to a real traumatic event, but from
another time, in the same way that “primitive agony” during childhood later elicits
a “fear of breakdown” (Winnicott, 1974; Roussillon, 1999).
internal solution to the enigma of its being; the hysteric ask to
Others the solution to her problems” (p. 112).
The return of traumatic elements will thus emerge sometimes
in the intermediate area of anomalous experiences. This
relationship between trauma and anomalous experiences can be
traced back to a small study reported by Wilson and Barber
(1983), which found a higher frequency of childhood traumas
amongst a group of people with fantasy prone personalities. This
result has been confirmed by further research on anomalous
experiences, trauma and dissociation (Ross and Joshi, 1992).
Irwin (1994) replicated these results with individuals whose
parents were alcoholics, and this study led him to develop the
“Childhood Factors Model,” in which anomalous experiences are
the consequence of childhood trauma leading both to fantasy
proneness (an escape thanks to imagination) and a strong need
for interpersonal control (as a defensive coping mechanism).
The traumatic elements will lead during adulthood to the
emergence of altered states of consciousness. These states of
consciousness may emerge close to sleep as already mentioned,
but they can also arise during broad daylight. From this point
of view, current research about hypnotic states from cognitive
neurosciences is helpful in order to help us better understand the
processes implicated in these experiences. This implies another
level of complexity because it is necessary to determine the
neurobiological areas associated with hallucinations depending
on the state of consciousness. This topic was first studied back
in the eighteenth century, notably by Franz Anton Mesmer,
who coined the term “animal magnetism,” by Le Marquis de
Puységur, with the idea of “magnetic somnambulism” and, later,
by Jean-Martin Charcot’s study of hypnosis at La Salpêtrière
(Ellenberger, 1994; Méheust, 1999). These early approaches—
also developed by Janet, who associated the extraordinary
neurosis with particular states of consciousness—emphasized
that a subject under hypnosis can experience mental imagery
in a particularly vivid manner. Today, research using functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) shows indeed that the
cerebral zones activated under hypnosis are close to those
activated when the person carries out the task in reality (Oakley
and Halligan, 2013). Hypnotic states not only allow a person
to “relive” events or to imagine new ones in a realistic manner,
but also tend to modify certain visual, auditory, and kinesthetic
aspects of the experience (Kosslyn et al., 2000). For example,
whilst under hypnotic suggestion, some people can place their
hand in scalding hot water without any discomfort (Rainville
et al., 1999). Moreover, clinical observations not only show
how easily some people can switch from one conscious state to
another, but also how much one’s psychological reality evolves
and changes depending on these consciousness states (Cardeña
and Winkelman, 2011). Many anomalous experiences arise in
these “strange states of consciousness” (Valla and Pélicier, 1992)
which could explain in part their realistic aspect, as is illustrated
by the following case:
Helen had a very good friend who used to be her boyfriend a
long time ago. He became sick and recently died. A few days
after his death, she is walking down the street thinking that he
could have lived a little bit longer if he had taken better care of his
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health. She starts feeling angry and having hostile thoughts toward
him. Then, all of a sudden, she finds herself in “a completely
different dimension” that she has trouble putting into words. She
feels as if she is filled with “clarity, infinite knowledge, and an
overwhelming love.” Then, she has a timeless experience of being
able to hear and communicate with her deceased friend. Unable
to explain this strong and emotional experience, she supposes
that she has entered into a direct communication with another
world, which she links with several coincidences that occurred
after this experience. Subsequently, she also develops a high level
of creativity and a baﬄing ability to reproduce the paintings of
famous artists.
During the several interviews we had together, we worked
on drawing lines between this experience and her personal
history. Helene was born prematurely, separated from her
mother for several months after her birth, and was raised
in part by her grandmother, as were most of the women
from her lineage. Her mother also did not have her own
father present when she grew up, and men from her side of
the family were “always absent.” On her father’s side, many
children had been abandoned. Furthermore, Helen explains
having been “terrified” of being abandoned at the moment of
her friend’s death. Since this experience, she has become very
sensitive and cannot stand interpersonal “attacks” that occur
around her. This palpable fragility seems tied to her early life
experiences and her intergenerational heritage. These aspects
of her story could have catalyzed her reaction to her friend’s
death and may have awoken a defensive reaction to a strong
separation anxiety developed in childhood. Thus, even if Helen
is structured enough to not break into depression or delusion,
her fragilities may have led her to have this disturbing mystical
experience.
In Helen’s case, the experience occurred after the death of a
loved one, in a context of grief, which is also frequent in
anomalous experiences. Moreover, although her experience was
short, it has produced long-term effects. The experience appears
as a kind of reassurance against anxiety, especially separation
anxiety. It seems then, that, like Helen, when some people face
a negative life event, they unconsciously fall into an altered state
of consciousness in order to avoid the negative impact of the
event. In this state of consciousness, they experience visual and
auditory hallucinations in a very realistic manner, similar to
self-hypnotic states. The fluctuation of a person’s hypnotizability
according to the situation they are in has indeed been shown
in other domains and, for example, people approaching the
end of their lives are more easily hypnotized (Spiegel, 1985).
When external reality becomes too difficult to live in and to
accept, some people will become more sensitive to hypnosis
and unconsciously enter into altered states of consciousness.
Moreover, if we refer to our previous structural analysis, the
case of Helene, as well as the cases of Beatrice and Catherine,
belongs to a neurotic register, in reaction to a negative life event
and a traumatic childhood. In Helene’s case, the hallucinatory
experience seems to correspond to the pleasure principle in
reaction to the trauma: her experience allowed her to “retrieve”
the lost relative in the same manner that the evil replaced the
deceased father in the case described by Freud of a demonological
neurosis.
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES,
HYPERSENSITIVITY, AND PSYCHIC
PERMEABILITY
If this structural analysis is useful for the purpose of proposing
a distinction between the processes implicated in anomalous
experiences, other psychoanalytical and complementary models
also help to improve the intelligibility of these experiences. In
particular, the altered states of consciousness and their links to
hallucinatory processes seem to be enlightened by contemporary
work about the concept of figurability (Darstellbarkeit) (the
ability of the psyche to make the absent object present in images).
Thus, Green (1993) has proposed a theory of hallucinatory
and figurability processes which describes their link with
the construction of mental processes. He supposes that we
progressively develop an internal space of representation in
encounters with the maternal environment. The mother has
to be progressively negatively hallucinated—defined as “the
non-perception of an object or of a perceptible psychical
phenomenon” (Green, 2005, p. 216)—in order to let the child
develop his/her own representation of her (Green, 1993). There
will thus be a constant and complex inter-relation between
negative hallucinations (the ability to not perceive the present
object) and positive hallucinations (the ability to produce an
image of the absent object). Anomalous experiences appear
in this regard in the form of a “spillover” of this internal
and negative hallucinatory frame, when something of the
internal processes of the subject cannot be contained and these
experiences may be considered to be “fluctuations” or “failures”
of the hallucinatory system.
Botella and Botella (2005) have deepened Green’s theories by
analyzing the links between figurability processes and traumatic
events. They define figurability as “a psychic property determined
by a tendency toward convergence, the actualization of which
triggers a process of binding all the constituents, all external
and internal stimuli” (Botella and Botella, 2005, p. 12). They
have analyzed, by means of clinical cases in analysis, how
regression states during seances allow the patient to produce
a hallucinatory figuration of a traumatic event, resulting in
“accidents of thoughts” both for the analyst and the patient.
Anomalous experiences could be considered from this point
of view to be some of these “accidents of thought” happening
outside the analytical setting. They are an attempt by the
psyche to develop a figurative hallucination in a particular
state of consciousness, which would give birth to an integrated
representation of traumatic experiences. The emergence of this
kind of hallucinatory processes is frequently associated with a
pronounced sensitivity which is also present in most of the
anomalous experiences. This strong sensitivity also helps us to
better understand the strong influence of cultural elements on the
subject. Another example will illustrate this hypersensitivity:
Palma describes the impression of being able to feel the emotions
of others and has had several precise “flashes” and “intuitions”
about relatives’ lives. This sensitivity—shared with her mother
and her grandmother—suddenly increased after a traumatic
accident she had at work a few years ago. However, as a child,
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she already used to see “entities” and apparitions, which she
still sees. She also reports frequent premonitory dreams. At her
work, this sensitivity is especially intense and she frequently
loses consciousness because of it. She explains that she is like
a “sponge,” as if she could “feel” what others feel, which has
made her coworkers progressively afraid of her. She has eventually
become disliked and rejected, and some of her colleagues have
started referring to her as the “witch,” while others have told
her that she was a medium. She finally attended training with
a healer and met a medium who confirmed her “mediumistic
abilities.” More generally, Palma describes her childhood as being
particularly insecure and violent, and interprets her sensitivity as
a reaction to a life that was “made up of shocks” and an attempt to
uphold close ties to others in order to anticipate their reactions.
This feeling of being like a “sponge” and having very “thin
boundaries” is common amongst people who report anomalous
experiences. This sensitivity was also present in the theories
of Myers (1903) who coined the term “transliminality” in
order to describe this psychological peculiarity. He described
it as a tendency of certain psychological contents to easily
pass through the barrier between the conscious and the
unconscious mind. A transliminality scale has since been
developed, followed by a revised version named the Rasch
Revised Transliminality Scale (Lange et al., 2000). People who
report anomalous experiences score higher on transliminality
scales than those who do not have such experiences, and
transliminality has also been correlated with trauma during
childhood (Thalbourne, 2000; Thalbourne et al., 2003). The
notion of mental boundaries has also been widely studied
by Hartmann (Hartmann, 1991; Harrison et al., 2006) who
distinguishes between several boundaries in the mind that can
be either thicker (impermeable) or thinner (permeable). Thinner
psychic permeability engenders “unexplained” interactions with
the environment and increases porosity to primary processes,
leading to feeling-related, empathetic and intuitive thoughts.
These feelings are sometimes interpreted afterwards as a “sixth
sense” or a “magic” link to other people. Psychic permeability also
leads to a strong sensitivity to the thoughts of others, which could
take the form of “flashes” and shared feelings.
Findings in neurosciences relating tomirror neurons, initiated
by Rizzolatti et al. (1996), shed light on the concept of psychic
permeability by underlining that certain types of neurons are
activated either when we carry out an action or when we
see someone else doing it. These neurons are differentially
activated according to the task at hand (e.g., picking up a
glass) and the associated intention (e.g., picking up a glass in
order to drink water) (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). Mirror
neurons also play an important role in social cognition, leading
to the “chameleon effect,” i.e., the unconscious tendency to
automatically reproduce the emotional and psychological states
of others (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999). These neurons also help
us understand the development of empathy: we perceive the
emotional states of others by activating the same emotional
state in ourselves (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2006). We are thus
intimately tied to those around us, and these interpersonal
processes are fundamental for our neurological and psychological
functioning. Some studies suggest that patients suffering from
autism could have a deficiency in the activation of this category
of neurons (Dapretto et al., 2006; Honaga et al., 2010). Inversely,
anomalous experiences may be the sign of a hyper-activation of
these neurons. Instead of an activation deficiency, some people
could have mirror neuron areas that are more easily aroused,
which could take the form of the “hypersensitivity” previously
evoked, as illustrated in the case of Kyra:
Kyra describes herself as a very sensitive person and reports
several anomalous experiences. She first speaks about several
OBEs, but she also frequently sees “entities” and sometimes
practices magnetism. She often hears strange noises in her house,
and she once felt paralyzed on her bed. This was a very disturbing
experience during which she had the feeling that an entity was
lying on her back. Since then, she has had the impression of
having a “hole” in her back where entities can “stick” to her when
she is in a “bad mood.” Despite these strange experiences, Kyra
manages to work (in the field of art), and has a son who also sees
the entities and who even draws some of them. One of the main
characteristics of Kyra seems to be that she has very thin mental
boundaries. For example, when someone is feeling bad around
her in the subway, she feels a strong discomfort in her own body.
Interestingly, she has a condition called Darier’s disease in which
“holes” can appear in her skin and can easily become infected, as
if the thinness of Kyra’s mental boundaries was also present in her
own skin.
As seen in the cases of Kyra and Palma, a higher degree of
sensitivity can lead to the feeling of being able to automatically
detect the emotional states of others. They seem to be
“contaminated” by other people’s emotions and cannot tell
the difference between them and their own feelings. In this
regard, they could be described as having an easily aroused “same
system,” which is described by Georgieff (2008) as a “process
that allows the reproduction of cerebral and mental activities
of an individual by those of another individual” (p. 365). This
“same system” is associated with a “who system” that enables
the individual to identify secondarily what is felt as belonging
to him. When these two systems do not function normally, they
engender what Georgieff calls “empathy pathologies,” which
are close to what is found in anomalous experiences. This
porosity between oneself and others seems to be frequently
associated with strong suffering in childhood. Some anomalous
experiences thus correspond to a form of “hyper-tuning” with
the environment in reaction to early traumatic events. This
hyper-tuning also produces a decrease in the boundaries with
the perceptive environment and leads to an attenuation of the
frontiers between internal representations and their expression
in the perceptive field.
Psychoanalytical models, especially those derived from the
Anglo-Saxon tradition, give a certain “thickness” to the
understanding of this hypersensitivity associated with anomalous
experiences, by connecting these observations to the way the
psyche is constructed. In particular,Winnicott’s (1958) and Bion’s
(1962) theories shed light on these processes by underlining the
role of the child’s environment and the primary mother-child
relationship for the construction of the psyche. They suppose
that the child alone is not able to integrate his emotional states
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and he needs to encounter an “Other” which will help him to
integrate his affective experiences. The child then progressively
constitutes his own psychic reality on the basis of these early
relationships and these interactions become the foundation of
the dynamic interaction of his own psychological processes.
As summed up by Roussillon et al. (2007): “the reflexive loop
keeps the trail of the intersubjective loop.” Bion (1967) also
studied these processes with the notion of a “contact-barrier”
that “separates mental phenomena into two groups, one of
which performs the functions of consciousness and the other the
functions of unconsciousness” (p. 22). The quality of this barrier
is determined by early relationships, varies widely from one
person to another and probably has an impact on the emergence
of anomalous experiences. Anzieu (1974), poursuing the theories
of Bion, suggested for his part the existence of the “Skin-Ego”
(Moi-Peau) which is based on the idea that “psychic envelopes”
are specifically formed according to a model of the functions of
the skin. As illustrated by the case of Kyra, the foundation of the
skin and the Ego seem to be closely entangled: “holes” in the skin
could be associated with “holes” in the psyche and lead to the
access of elements that would normally remain unconscious.
Federn (1956) had also analyzed this kind of hypersensitivity
to the environnement with what he calls the “frontiers of the
Ego.” He studied the “normal breath” of the Ego and the
“feeling of the Ego,” which varies according to the different
states of consciousness, and which he ties to empathy and
telepathy (p. 257). Federn describes the constant fluctuation of
mental boundaries, which leads, in some situations, tomysterious
modifications in the perception of the Self that can take the
form of anomalous experiences, especially mystical experiences.
More specifically, he suggests that psychic permeability is “two-
sided,” with a strong psychic permeability between conscious
and unconscious processes, and also between the internal and
external worlds. We propose that these processes are also
“two-directional,” as they can lead to both perceptive (e.g., in
psi experiences and OBE) and projective (e.g., in magnetism
experiences) processes. The cognitive and affective functioning
associated with these experiences then constitutes a disadvantage
corresponding to difficulties in the psychological categorization
between internal and external worlds, but also an advantage
because they may then lead to a capacity for healthy adaptation
and to the heightened expression of creativity.
This potential increase in psychic permeability will take
different forms depending on the multiple forms of traumatic
configuration at its origin. We have observed that in a number
of clinical cases this kind of permeability seems to appear
in patients suffering from pronounced narcissistic suffering,
especially patients who seem to have been confronted during
their early childhood with a mother going through a major
depressive episode. Green proposed to name this phenomenon
the “Complex of the dead mother” (Green, 1983). Here, patients
suddenly confronted with a depressed mother experience
a “failure of the experience of “individualizing separation,”
where the young Ego, instead of constituting the container of
subsequent investment after the separation, tries to retain the
primary object and repetitively relive its loss, which induces at
the level of the primary ego confounded with the object (. . . ) a
feeling of void characteristic of depression” (p. 248). This concept
echoes what was described by a patient, Petra, who reported
that her mother was suddenly and profoundly depressed during
her early childhood. She later developed, after a breakup, strong
and frequent psi perceptions involving her ex-girlfriend. In this
kind of case there is not a clear trauma but rather a form of
“mark” or “trail” let into the psyche by primitive experiences
during early relationships. These “marks” would then take the
form of a hypersensitivity with two main unconscious purposes.
The first one would be to keep the link to the Other in a desperate
manner, in order to retain or avoid the psychic separation with
the primary object and to repair the damage caused by this early
loss. From this point of view, psi experiences would be a way
to maintain the feeling of being linked to the other by being
able to guess his or her thoughts. The second function of this
hypersensitivity usually appears after later mistreatment during
childhood, and manifests itself as an attempt to be very sensitive
to variations in the environment, and thus anticipate possible
abuse.
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCES AND
EXTREME FORMS OF SYMBOLIZATION
A short summary seems necessary before going further in our
analysis concerning the links between anomalous experiences
and symbolization processes. We have so far tackled how
hallucinatory experiences are present in the general population,
which have led psychiatric epidemiology to consider the existence
of a psychotic phenotype widely distributed in the population.
Anomalous experiences could also fit into this category of
hallucinatory experiences, even if, as underlined notably by Le
Maléfan (2014) “hallucinatory as well as delusion experiences
and anomalous experiences do not overlay entirely” (p. 169).
A number of factors would nevertheless be common between
them, like environmental factors, the influence of traumas during
childhood and probably some neurobiological mechanisms.
Psychoanalytic approaches, especially the Lacanian structural
model, propose more precisely that there may be a difference of
nature rather than a difference of degree between the different
forms of hallucinatory processes, depending on the neurotic or
psychotic underlying structure (Evrard, 2014)8. This difference
is also useful in helping us to understand the process of
symbolization associated with anomalous experiences.
As illustrated by the five clinical cases proposed in this paper,
if anomalous experiences look like psychotic experiences, most
of the time they are likely to be associated with a neurotic
structure from a psychoanalytical and structural point of view.
More precisely, from what we can observe in the counseling
service, four persons out of every five possess an underlying
neurotic structure (Evrard, 2014). Thus, anomalous experiences
relate most of the time to an extreme form of expression of
neurosis, which confirms the analysis of Janet (Evrard, 2013b)
and Maleval (1981). These experiences will emerge most of the
time during altered states of consciousness and are linked to a
8It would be interesting, from this point of view, to question the possibility to study
such a difference of structure thanks to the current cognitive neurosciences tools.
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pronounced psychic permeability, leading to a form of sensitivity
to cultural material associated with the paranormal. Nevertheless,
even if the processes of these experiences are better understood
by means of the structural model, they cannot be entirely
reduced to it. For example, a number of anomalous experiences
appear as being “trans-nosographic” given their heterogeneity,
their multiple context of emergence and the complexity of their
processes. For example, NDEs or OBEs emerge in both neurotic
and psychotic structures without a clear difference in the way
they are described (Rabeyron and Caussie, in press). Thus, even
if both psychiatric and structural points of view are relevant
and improve our understanding of these experiences, they do
not entirely explain the logic of the processes of anomalous
experiences.
Contemporary models of symbolization based on the
“metapsychology of processes” (Roussillon, 2001, 2015) offer
a complementary point of view to the Lacanian approach,
especially in the continuation of Bion’s work. This model
supposes in particular a stronger permeability between the
different psychological processes belonging to neurosis and
psychosis, and places more focus on narcissistic and self-identity
suffering. We will not explain here the commonalities and
differences between the Bionian and the Lacanian models9;
our aim is rather to propose a complementary “vertex”
of heuristic value in order to improve the intelligibility of
anomalous experiences. The metapsychology of processes seems
especially relevant in allowing us to understand the archaic
and symboligenic aspects of primary forms of symbolization,
and appears easier to integrate with cognitive neuroscience
discoveries.
Thus, following most keenly the model of symbolization
suggested by Bion (1962), several French psychoanalysts
(working mainly with psychotic and borderline patients in the
1970s in France) have developed concepts that detail the pre-
symbolic construction of the psyche, notably Anzieu’s (1987)
“formal signifiers” and Aulagnier’s (1975) “pictograms.” These
theories—which we cannot describe in detail here—analyze
precisely the processes of transformation of the psyche and
the early forms of subjective appropriation. They underline
how the psyche produces its first forms of thoughts in close
articulation with the body and the environment. Along the
same line of thought, Roussillon (1999, 2015) has proposed
more recently that there may be a distinction between primary
and secondary symbolization processes. The first level of
transformation (primary symbolization) concerns essentially
non-verbal experiences, while the second level of transformation
(secondary symbolization) deals especially with the verbal
description of subjective experiences. Roussillon (2015) defines
primary symbolization more precisely as “the process that moves
from the “raw material” of experience, the perceptive mnemic
trace (. . . ) which carries the sensory-motor trade of the impact
of the encounter of the subject with a still poorly differentiated,
poorly identified object, confusing part of the subject and part
9We recommand to the reader interested in the differences between the Lacanian
and Bionian model the written retranscriptions of Pierre-Henri Castel’s seminars
(2006-2007) untitled ≪ Lacan/Bion: qu’est-ce que l’appareil psychique? ≫
available here: http://pierrehenri.castel.free.fr/
of the object, to a possibility of scientification which is able
to “become language,” able to be narrated to another subject,
to thus be shared and recognized by another subject to in
turn become assimilable into subjectivity” (p. 594). A deficit of
integration of the subjective experience at the different levels of
psychic transformation will lead to multiple forms of expression
of human suffering.
From this perspective, hallucinatory processes, states of
consciousness and psychic permeability can be considered to
be three complementary aspects of the symbolization process
implicated in anomalous experiences. They show how the
psyche represents and transforms its past and current internal
experience in extreme situations. The psyche can use these
“cursors” in order to handle the subtle tuning between the
internal and the external worlds, between the subject and its
environment. Anomalous experiences appear from this point
of view at the frontiers of the symbolization abilities of the
psyche; they are attempts to explore new and extreme forms of
psychic solutions. These experiences are also at the frontiers of
subjectivity and they implicate a process of transformation that
is a risk in itself because it can also overflow the capabilities of
psychic transformation. They can thus have both positive and
negative consequences, explaining the difficulty in categorizing
these experiences from the point of view of psychopathology.
Cognitive neurosciences also explore how the brain gives
birth to subjectivity and can improve our understanding of
the emergence of anomalous experiences. Damasio (2012) and
Edelman (1990) both describe how early stages of functioning
lead progressively to the development of consciousness and
subjectivity. Damasio (2012) proposes in particular a distinction
between the protoself (neural patterns representative of the
body’s internal state), the core consciousness (the organism
becoming aware of its own feelings) and the extended
consciousness (higher levels of thought that implicate time
and space, and lead to autobiographical memories). Edelman
(1990) and Edelman et al. (2011) describes for his part a
distinction between primary consciousness and a higher order
of consciousness relying on a dynamic core (a pattern of neural
activity leading to particular mental functioning), and the reentry
(continual signaling from one brain region to another) of brain
maps progressively selected by evolution. These models shed
light on the fact that subjectivity is a consequence of several
layers of consciousness, progressively developing from primary
consciousness to higher orders of consciousness, and involving
complex inter-relationships with the environment.
These models also underline the idea that primary
consciousness and higher order consciousness are always
interconnected. Earlier phases of development are still present in
the functioning of the human mind, and anomalous experiences
could be considered as a return or a regression to earlier
modes of primary symbolization at a concrete presymbolic
level of the psyche10. The process of transformation implicated
in anomalous experiences concerns in particular primary
10We can’t describe here in detail the complex links between symbolization
processes in neurosciences and psychoanalysis. The reader can find more
information on this topic in Rabeyron (in press).
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symbolization processes, which lead to specific modes of
integration and transformation of the subjective experience.
They can be conceptualized as an extreme form of symbolization
associated with primitive functioning of the psyche, where
there is a lack of distinction between the self, the body and the
environment. From this point of view, anomalous experiences
give an original and specific insight into the functioning of the
symbolization process. For example, these experiences frequently
produce a feeling of interconnectedness (similar to that described
byHelen), which can be understood as a reappearance of a feeling
of primary communication when the Ego and the environment
are not separated. Another example is provided by magnetism
experiences, which can also be seen as a return to the feeling of
the kind of “magical” interaction between the mother and her
baby. They could be seen as a metaphor of the regression to early
relationships in which the mother transforms the feelings and
“heals” her baby, in order to increase symbolization processes.
Thus, anomalous experiences could be a kind of “vestige” of
these primary forms of intersubjective links.
These processes are often present during crisis situations
and imply a psychological survival process, which acts as a
kind of “shortcut,” and whose main function is to contain
overwhelming emotions in order to protect the psyche from a
potential collapse. For example, the ability to perceive oneself
“outside” one’s body may have a protective function during
situations of psychological or physical danger (Greyson, 2007;
Rabeyron, in press). This defensive process probably relies
on a sudden increase of permeability in the brain which
modifies psychological associativity (Edelman, 1990) associated
with specific neurobiological functioning. Some research suggests
in particular that anomalous experiences are linked to an increase
in temporal lobe ability, a reduction of cognitive inhibition
and an increase in communication between the higher and
lower parts of the brain, especially between the cortex and the
limbic system (Simmonds-Moore, 2010). This increase could
also take different forms depending on the type of anomalous
experience, considering that such a mechanism represents a
sort of “rescue system” in which the normal laws of cognitive
associativity are modified when the subject is confronted with
a strong emotional disturbance. This mechanism is probably
crucial in the emergence of anomalous experiences, and would
correspond to a coping strategy comparable to the “strategy
of the reed,” in which the psyche chooses to bend instead of
breaking. However, some people will not be able to integrate
this specific anomalous pattern, which would then result in a
psychological collapse, as can be seen, for example, after some
mystical experiences (Chouvier, 2006). Thus, the same processes
that are seen at the origins of the construction of the psyche
suddenly reappear in an original manner when metabolization
processes are overwhelmed, and the same particular functioning
of the psyche is to be found both in primary relationships and
anomalous experiences.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anomalous experiences occur when a person is confronted with
an experience that does not fit with his usual conception of
reality, an “extraordinary” interaction with the environment
that can produce both a positive and a negative impact on
mental health. We have proposed several ways of considering
and explaining their phenomenology, relying on research about
hallucinatory processes, altered states of consciousness, and
psychic permeability, which are the main specificities of an
“anomaly prone personality” (Simmonds-Moore, 2010). In order
to better understand the processes linked to these experiences,
a psychoanalytical and Lacanian structural approach has been
useful in allowing us to recognize the particularity of these
experiences depending on the structure in which they emerge.
We have then proposed an analysis relying on the primary forms
of symbolization in order to study the symboligenic aspects of
anomalous experiences.
In additition to these psychoanalytical models, the double
stance proposed by crossing the psychoanalytical approaches
and cognitive models is essential in order to shed light on
the specificity of anomalous experiences. More precisely, the
differences in the current psychoanalytical models could benefit
from knowledge of cognitive neurosciences, and the position at
the “frontiers” of anomalous experiences could be part of this
dialogue. For example, in the samemanner as we are able to better
understand the different areas implicated in dreams by crossing
psychoanalysis and neuroimagery (Kaplan-Solms and Solms,
2002; Ruby, 2011), a similar approach could be progressively
developed in the field of anomalous experiences. One of the
best examples is provided by research concerning OBE, which
allows us to draw bridges between subjective experiences and
neurological functioning, in order to improve our knowledge
of embodiment processes. A number of studies have recently
been conducted on other anomalous experiences, especially with
regards to mystical experiences (Beauregard and Paquette, 2006),
and NDEs (Thonnard et al., 2013). If cognitive neurosciences
help us to better understand the neurological specificity of these
experiences, psychoanalysis facilitates our understanding of their
impact on subjectivity.
The use of both psychoanalysis and cognitive neurosciences
also allows us to avoid “mutilating” these experiences, by
taking into account the different levels of reality they imply.
Indeed, a trap of which we must steer clear would be to
assume that anomalous experiences are of a purely neurological
nature, all the while ignoring the emotional context of their
emergence and the associated meaning of the transformation
and metabolization processes they imply. A second trap would
be to focus only on the meaning and the phenomenology of
these experiences, while neglecting to consider their physiological
and neurological correlates and their more global neurological
functions. Future studies on this topic should continue to bring
these aspects together, as in the more global projects developed
by neuropsychoanalysts (Solms and Turnbull, 2011), in order to
develop an integrative model of anomalous experiences.
This project could also help to better inform clinicians
on how to help people who have difficulties in coping with
anomalous experiences. As proposed by a recent paper in the
American Journal of Psychiatry (Lomax et al., 2011) describing
the clinical case of a patient in psychodynamic therapy reporting
several anomalous experiences, it is important “to encourage
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clinicians to be open to their patients’ descriptions of anomalous
experiences and to work with patients to construct meaning
of these experiences that will promote health, positive coping,
and growth” (p. 12). The clinician has to be able to recognize
these experiences which could be “fundamentally about creating
(or revealing) meaning, narrative, and story to an individual
in some difficult or even traumatic situation” (Lomax et al.,
2011, p. 15). In particular, it is important that clinicians help
their patients to integrate and make sense of these unusual and
disturbing experiences. This can be accomplished by having
an open attitude, and by avoiding adverse responses such as
fear, rejection, and fascination. There is indeed a kind of
“address” of the anomalous experience as a trail of the aborted
transformation process, and the experience demands to be shared
for the same reason. Research in these directions could then
lead to original theoretical and practical implications in further
classical domains—for example, non-pathological hallucinations
and their expression in the general population, or extreme forms
of symbolization—which may be useful for both psychoanalysis
and neurosciences.
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